The problem

The internet works. But using it reveals more than necessary, and anyone who wants a name in it depends on a few organisations.

1. Names belong to a few

Domain extensions are managed by a small number of organisations. Good names have been taken for years or are resold at high prices; some extensions cost many times more than others. Whoever controls an extension can suspend or redirect a name – often without users being able to verify it.

2. Metadata reveals more than content

Even when a connection is encrypted, it remains visible who talks to whom, when, how often and how much. DNS queries show the provider which sites someone visits. Cookies and trackers link visits across many sites into a profile.

3. Trust in many strangers

HTTPS relies on hundreds of certificate authorities, and each of them can issue a certificate for any domain. Transparency logs (Certificate Transparency) make mistakes visible – after the fact. Mail depends on providers who can read content, and on phone numbers.

4. Good tools, but separate

Tor protects the path very well, but it has no memorable names (an onion address has 56 characters), no mail and no simple hosting. Encrypted messengers solve chat, not sites. Anyone who wants everything combines many programs and easily makes mistakes along the way.

What Mainnet is

Mainnet is an overlay network: it runs over the internet but has its own names, its own encryption rules and its own browser. Every user runs a node. Names are allocated in one place; the network is operated in a distributed way.

Central allocation, distributed operation

cypherpunk2077.com is only the registry: it allocates and reviews names, keeps the registry log and distributes the programs. It hosts no websites. Other people's content is only present on the registry's machines in encrypted form – as mail envelopes and file pieces on the two launch nodes, which the registry cannot open.

Sites, mailboxes and files live with their owners and on users' nodes. A node keeps a copy of the log and resolves names itself. If cypherpunk2077.com fails, existing sites keep working; there are then no new approvals or suspensions (chapter 13).

Roles

Own extensions

Any extension of 2 to 20 letters is possible: .com, .de, .net, .org, .cp77 and new ones such as .atelier. The namespace is separate from the old internet: shop.de in Mainnet is not the same site as shop.de on the internet. To avoid confusion, the Mainnet Browser shows the badge ◆ Mainnet on every Mainnet site and keeps Mainnet and the old internet in separate profiles. Reserved are, among others, .onion, .local, .test and file extensions.

Programs

Mainnet and the old internet compared

Architecture

Mainnet is built in eight layers. Each layer has a clear task and only uses the layers below. That way each one can be checked and replaced on its own.

The layers in brief

• L0 Transport. The default is Tor, embedded through Arti (the Rust implementation of Tor). In “Fast” mode connections go directly over QUIC or TCP.
• L1 Overlay network. mainnetd based on libp2p: Kademlia DHT for discovery, a signed bootstrap list for entry, limits against overload.
• L2 Identity and crypto. One key instead of a password; subkeys for mail, chat and devices. Details in chapter 7.
• L3 Data and storage. Content as BLAKE3-addressed pieces, distributed storage k of n, mailbox storage, local copy of the log.
• L4 Names and registry. The own naming system with transparency log, witnesses and zones signed by the owner (chapter 5).
• L5 Services. Websites, mail for every domain, chat, files, search, tunnels (chapter 8).
• L6 Applications. Browser, app, command line, Studio.
• L7 Administration. Portal, review, payment in bitcoin, admin panel, heartbeat, tripwires.

Maturity per component

For software, “done” means four different things. The table shows how far along each component is.

yes partly noLocal = automated tests on one computerReal = over the real Tor networkLive = running on the 2 nodes

Names and the registry log

The registry decides who gets a name. But every decision is recorded publicly in a log that can only grow, and every node checks it for itself. Later changes become visible as soon as independent witnesses check; today the witnesses are still run by the operator.

How it works

1. Entries. Every approval (register), renewal (renew), transfer, suspension (suspend, revoke) and every heartbeat is an entry. Suspensions carry a public reason code.
2. Merkle tree. The entries form a hash tree following Certificate Transparency (RFC 9162, C2SP tlog). A later state must contain the earlier one; a short consistency proof shows this.
3. Checkpoint. Size, root hash and time are signed twice with the log key: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum), both required.
4. Witnesses. Independent witnesses cosign every checkpoint that is consistent with the previous one. They refuse a fork (two different states of the same size) and store it as evidence that anyone can verify.
5. Nodes. Every node mirrors the log and accepts a checkpoint only with both log signatures and at least 2 of 3 witness cosignatures that differ from the checkpoint by at most 600 seconds. It resolves names from this copy – without a DNS query. The browser only shows “◆ verified” if the checkpoint is at most 24 hours old.

What runs today

The log has been in operation since 29 Oct 2026. As of 30 Oct 2026: checkpoint 13, published at cypherpunk2077.com/log/v1/checkpoint, with 3 cosignatures; 6 domains; entry 12 is the operator's first signed heartbeat.

Goal: at least three independent witnesses in different countries, content checks switched on, admin signature checked by nodes and witnesses. Only then is “tamper-proof” an honest statement.

Why not a mining blockchain?

A blockchain with proof of work (mining) only protects if computing power is widely distributed; a small network tips over as soon as an attacker controls more than half. In a registry with an operator, the operator decides who gets a name anyway. A transparency log with independent witnesses does more here: an entry is in a signed checkpoint after about a minute at most, without the power consumption of mining, and anyone can check it. (The approval itself is reviewed by the operator by hand, within 24 to 48 hours.) The “validators” are the witnesses. The same pattern secures the web's certificates today (Certificate Transparency) and signed software (Sigstore).

Zones and certificates

What lives under a domain (site, mailbox, onion address) is signed by the owner with their own key. That key is created on the owner's device; the registry never receives it. Instead of certificate authorities there are domain certificates derived from log and zone, plus a transfer lock, and transfers only with signatures of both the old and the new owner.

Encryption

Mainnet does not invent its own cryptography. It uses reviewed methods and libraries and applies them so that content is encrypted on the device. Where possible today, the methods are post-quantum hybrid: classical and post-quantum at the same time, so that breaking one of them alone is not enough.

Methods per purpose

Key hierarchy

• Root: dual key, split into 5 shares (Shamir, 3 of 5); signs manifests only.
• Admin: approve, suspend, heartbeat. Login to the panel with admin file and PIN; every action double-signed (today in a separate public file, not yet in the log); suspensions are recorded in the log with a reason code.
• Log: signs checkpoints. Witnesses: listed in the manifest with their keys.
• Release: signs programs and updates. A node installs an update only after asking, only over Tor and only if signature and checksum match.
• User keys are created on the user's device. Buying a domain buys only the approval; the key belongs to the buyer alone.

Mail, chat and hosting

Every domain comes with mail and a site. On top come chat, contacts, files, search and tunnels. Everything runs over the same node and the same keys.

Mail

• Every domain has mail; the mailbox is a key. postmaster@ receives, among other things, the expiry reminders.
• Post offices only hold encrypted envelopes until the recipient collects them (the role is off by default and can be switched on voluntarily; then 1 GiB, kept for at most 90 days). The recipient appears there only as a blinded daily identifier.
• Against spam: a small proof of work for senders the recipient does not know; the recipient sets its size.
• Mail to ordinary internet addresses is a draft: only for explicitly approved users, via a separate server, never with forged senders. Not built.

Status: code complete, tested locally between nodes, with mixing and decoys. Both production nodes have the post-office role switched on. Not yet tested over the real Tor network between two computers.

Chat and contacts

• 1:1 and groups of up to 256 members, Double Ratchet with X-Wing.
• Contacts via a contact code, safety number or QR code; verification with a shared secret (SPAKE2). If a verified contact's key changes, Mainnet stops sending and asks.

Status: code complete, tested locally with three nodes. Not in the real network; the construction is to be reviewed externally.

Hosting: a site as one file

• The SDK packs a folder – pages, images and server logic – into one .site file (default up to 20 MiB, at most 200 MiB). Server logic runs as WebAssembly in the node; Rust, C/C++ and Go are supported, other languages experimental.
• Everyone hosts their own site: on a PC, VPS or Raspberry Pi. The default is hidden through an onion service; “host directly” is faster but shows the IP.
• Publish with the deploy key file or in the browser's Studio: editor with live preview, publishing after confirmation.

Status: code complete, tested locally, disposable hidden sites served over the real Tor network. No user's site on the network yet.

Search

Search only finds approved Mainnet sites. Goal: indexers are run only by independent nodes, not by the registry. Today one (empty) indexer runs on the operator's VPS. Queries always go over Tor. Honestly: the indexer sees the search terms – it is not end-to-end search. Today no indexer is connected in the portal.

Tunnels

Make SSH, a game server or a local web app reachable over Mainnet, as a port on 127.0.0.1, only with permission per peer. Status: preview, tested locally.

Distributed storage

Private files and mail are split into pieces after encryption and spread over different nodes. A single node then only holds an encrypted, incomplete piece. Reassembly and decryption happen only on the user's device.

Method

• Encrypt first, then split: a systematic Reed-Solomon erasure code over GF(2¹⁶). The first k pieces are parts of the ciphertext, the rest are parity pieces.
• Files 3 of 5, mail 2 of 3: any k pieces are enough.
• Each piece has a BLAKE3 address and a checksum. The result is checked against the identifier of the whole ciphertext; forged pieces are detected. At most 256 combinations are tried so that forgeries cannot cause heavy computation.
• Each storage node receives at most one piece of a file.

Goal: splitting switches on without changing the program: for files from three storage providers as 2 of 3, from five fully as 3 of 5; for mail from three post offices. The program does not check whether the nodes are really independent – splitting only helps with nodes that do not belong to the operator.

Running a node

Mainnet lives through its nodes. Every user has one; whoever wants to contribute more keeps it running and switches on roles such as post office or storage.

Roles of a node

A node only stores encrypted pieces and envelopes it cannot open, plus its own sites and the cache of sites visited by its user. Every role can be switched off. In the default Anonymous mode the node opens no listening port outside 127.0.0.1 (only the local API listens there); it only makes outgoing connections to Tor.

In operation today

• Node 1 (VPS): entry point for new nodes, post office, storage, (empty) indexer. Deliberately runs directly with a public IP and additionally has an onion entrance.
• Node 2 (operator's PC): post office and storage, only over Tor. Its onion entrance sometimes reports failed descriptor uploads; reachability from outside has not been shown yet.
• The VPS hosting provider filters a large share of Tor exits (about 80 %). Nodes therefore fetch log and bootstrap list via the portal's onion mirror first.

Domains and points

A domain costs €4.99 a year – the same for every extension, with no premium names. Payment is in bitcoin; accounting is in points.

Rules

• €4.99 = 500 points = exactly one year (same day, same time UTC). The first approval lasts one year, then 500 points extend it by another year each – or more at once.
• Bitcoin via a self-hosted BTCPay server; every invoice has its own address and a unique amount.
• Different amounts are converted into points: too little gives less, too much gives more time (±1 % counts as exact). Minimum for a new domain is 250 points, for a renewal 10. Anything beyond 10 years is refunded. Points are credited after review, within 24 to 48 hours.
• Points belong to exactly one domain; they cannot be transferred or paid out.
• Public is only the expiry date in the log – no amounts and no people. Bitcoin payments themselves are public in the bitcoin blockchain.
• Reminders go to the domain's postmaster@, without payment links (phishing protection). Top-ups only through the browser, the command line or the purchase chat.

Review before approval

The operator approves every domain by hand. The review covers name, brand and payment, not content. Content is assessed after a report against the terms of use; suspensions are recorded in the log with a reason code, and appeals are possible.

• Well-known brands and companies are given only to whoever proves that the name is theirs: via a DNS TXT record in the company's real internet domain, which only its owner can set (decided on 30 Oct 2026). A company has priority only if its domain or brand is older than the Mainnet entry. The proof shows control over the domain, not trademark rights. The automatic proof is not built yet; until then the operator checks by hand.
• Generic words such as “shop” or “insurance” get no priority through the DNS proof. Common words are available at most once per person.
• Operator's reserve: the operator holds back some sought-after generic names. The list will be published before advertising starts and contains no third-party brands. From 2027 these names are allocated by a verifiable lottery at the normal price, by 31 Dec 2027 at the latest; participants in the lottery deposit €4.99.
• The operator's launch domains, public in the log: mainnet.com, cypherpunk2077.com, cypherpunk2077.de, test.net, shop.com, revaultstudio.com. A trademark check for shop.com is still pending. The labels mainnet and cypherpunk2077 are also protected.

Security and testing

Mainnet is tested a lot, but so far only by its own developers. There is no external audit yet. Until then Mainnet is a beta and unreviewed.

What is checked

• Automated tests for every crate, end-to-end tests with several nodes in one process, a test network in Docker with 6 nodes, log service, witnesses and bitcoin regtest.
• Robustness: property tests over all parsers; fuzzing found one bug, which is fixed.
• Real Tor tests on two days (chapter 6).
• Mandatory checks before launch (go/no-go): secret scan over everything that is published, portal check over Tor (602 of 604 on 29 Oct; the two red ones concerned the log, which did not exist yet), server hardening without errors.
• Updates only signed, only over Tor and only after asking; tampered files are rejected (tested, never run with a real release).

Protective features

• Tripwires: real-looking decoys on the registry's servers; touching one raises an alarm. They are running; alarms currently only go to the log.
• Self-test “Am I protected?” in the browser (built into the app, but the app has never been started on a device): leaks around Tor, clock, version.
• Heartbeat: the operator is meant to sign a heartbeat into the log regularly; the first one has been there since 29 Oct 2026 (entry 12); if it is missing, the programs warn after 14 or 30 days. This never automatically grants anyone else any rights.
• Data minimisation: no cookies, no trackers, no IP logs in the portal, visitors counted only as daily totals. This is a pledge that cannot be verified from outside – over Tor it is not needed.

Please report security issues as described in cypherpunk2077.com/.well-known/security.txt, over Tor if you like. Honest research is welcome.

Limits and risks

This chapter collects what Mainnet does not provide today – as completely as possible, even where points are already stated in other chapters.

1. Beta without external audit. Bugs are likely; anyone whose safety depends on it should not rely on Mainnet alone today.
2. Two nodes, one operator. Mainnet's own layer has no anonymity set yet; splitting does not take effect.
3. Witnesses run by the operator. The log is verifiable but not yet tamper-proof towards the operator. The admin double signature is not yet in the log, and the brake against mass suspensions only works in the admin panel, not in the protocol.
4. Keys in one place. Root shares, release key and password file are on one computer at launch.
5. No mix network. Against a very strong observer of both ends, Mainnet helps only to a limited degree.
6. No release yet. The programs are built but neither signed nor published; the existing release draft is out of date. There is no installer and no code-signing certificate yet; Windows will warn at first.
7. Entry only with a ready-made configuration. The root fingerprint and the bootstrap key are not yet built into the program. A fresh node finds neither the network nor the names without a supplied configuration.
8. Much only tested locally. Mail and chat have never run between two computers over the real Tor network, nor has splitting. Cover traffic has never been tested against the real network. Search is not connected in the portal.
9. Android app never started. The app is built but has never run on a device; iOS is not built.
10. Bridges missing in the node. obfs4 and Snowflake are built but not yet passed through to Tor in the node. Where Tor is blocked, Mainnet does not get through today.
11. Classical signatures. Users, zones, sites, the bootstrap list and witnesses sign with Ed25519 only, so not post-quantum secure.
12. Search sees search terms. The indexer learns what is searched for – not who is searching.
13. Purchase chat in an ordinary browser. Whoever opens the purchase chat in an ordinary browser trusts the code the site delivers. Safest are mainnet chat or the Mainnet Browser; the web-chat fallback is only classically encrypted.
14. Central allocation. The operator can suspend domains – on purpose, under the terms of use and publicly in the log. Mainnet is meant to keep running against attackers, not against its legitimate operator.
15. Registry outage. Without a running log service there are no checkpoints, approvals or suspensions. After 24 hours nodes show names as “unverified”; existing sites keep resolving. An emergency kit for restarting is built but not yet in operation.
16. Limits of Tor. Tor is slower than direct connections, can be blocked, and after start it takes a few minutes until a hidden site is reachable.
17. Network filters. The hosting provider of the entry node filters many Tor exits; Mainnet falls back to onion addresses.
18. Legal. No legal entity in Germany, the operator's company is based abroad, no imprint; the legal and tax review is still pending.
19. Bitcoin. Payments are public in the bitcoin blockchain; the exchange rate fluctuates.
20. Your device. Malware, an unencrypted computer or a shared key defeat any protection.
21. Browser base. The Mainnet Browser is built on Qt WebEngine (Chromium) and must adopt its security updates promptly.

Roadmap

The order is fixed, the dates are not. A step only counts as done once it runs in real operation.

Decided, not yet built

• Free launch offer: received by 31 Dec 2026, approved by 31 Jan 2027 (chapter 11).
• Proof for company domains via DNS TXT; reserve list and lottery from 2027.
• Points for node operators from 2027, at most 250 points per domain.
• Marketplace at first as a showcase.
• Mail to ordinary internet addresses for approved users (draft).

The operator decided these points on 30 Oct 2026 (outgoing mail on 29 Oct); they are not yet built or in operation. Until then they are not properties of Mainnet.